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v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 322 A.2d 809 (1974).

Defendants Curtis Sims and Ronald Ward were each charged
in a two count indictment with working for a lottery business and
with possession of lottery slips.' At trial, the jury found both
defendants guilty of the "working for" offense but not guilty of

"possession." 2 The trial judge granted the defendants' motion for a
new trial on the grounds that the evidence admissible at trial on the

"working for" charge was insufficient to support a conviction, and
"that as a matter of law the verdicts were inconsistent.

'3

The

State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 363, 322 A.2d 809, 811 (1974). Defendants were indicted
under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:121-3 (1969), which states in pertinent part:
Any person who:
a. Knowingly engages as a messenger, clerk or copyist, or in any other capacity
... where lottery slips . . . or lists of drawings of a lottery . . . are printed, kept or
used in connection with the business of lottery . . . or
b. Knowingly possesses any paper, document, slip or memorandum that perrains in any way to the business of lottery . . . except . . . [as] authorized, sponsored
and operated by any State of the United States ....
2 . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 363, 322 A.2d 809, 811 (1974).
3 Id. At trial, testimony of two police officers was admitted concerning surveillance they
had made of the defendants' activities on four occasions prior to the date of arrest. See Brief
of the State of New Jersey at 3, State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 322 A.2d 809 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as State's Brief]. Defense counsel objected to the admission of this testimony on] the
ground that the indictment charged the defendants with criminal activity on a particular
date, and testimony concerning defendants' activity on other dates was irrelevant and only
served to prejudice their case. Id. at 4. The judge held that pursuant to the doctrine of State
v. Gattling, 95 N.J. Super. 103, 110, 230 A.2d 157, 161 (App. Div. 1967), surveillance
evidence procured on days other than the date in the indictment was admissible, but only for
the purpose of showing criminal knowledge on the part of the defendants. 65 N.J. at 365,
322 A.2d at 812. Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:121-3 (1969), participation in lottery activities
and possession of lottery materials are both "knowledge" offenses. See note 1 supra. The
judge instructed the jury. that surveillance evidence could not be used to corroborate the
commission of a crime, but only to determine " 'whether or not the acts, if ...
they were
done by the defendants . . . were a knowing one [sic].' " State's Brief, supra at 8-9 (quoting
from the Record at T235-2 to -6). While the judge's discussion of the surveillance evidence
was contained in his charge to the jury concerning only the "possession" count, the judge did
instruct the jury that knowledge was an element of both the "possession" offense and the
"working for" offense. 65 N.J. at 365, 322 A.2d at 812.
Following conviction, the defendants moved for a new trial. During argument on that
motion, the court reversed its earlier position and stated that knowledge was not an element
of the "working for" offense. State's Brief, supra at 10. The court therefore held that the
admission of the surveillance evidence served to prejudice the defendants with respect to
that count. Id. The court further concluded that having found the defendants innocent of
possession of lottery materials, the jury could have based its verdict of guilt on the "working
for" charge only on the surveillance evidence, which, in the court's opinion, was inadmissible
on that charge. Id. at 10-11. The court thus found the record void of sufficient evidence to
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Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, granted the
state's motion for leave to appeal the new trial order. 4 Prior to
argument before the appellate division, the state petitioned the
Supreme Court of New Jersey to certify the case. Certification was
granted at the same time the highest court denied a defense mo5
tion to dismiss the appeal.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Sims,6 concluded
that the order granting the defendants a new trial should be
reversed because "it [was] erroneous for easily reviewable reasons
of law." ' More significantly, however, in reaching this decision the
court had to deal with the question of the right of the state to
appeal an order granting a new trial in a criminal case. At the time
of the court's deliberation, that right was limited by the rule established in State v. LaFera8 that the state could seek leave to appeal
the granting of a new trial to a criminal defendant only if that
grant were based on an issue collateral to the main case and arising
outside the record." The supreme court rejected the LaFera distinction between new trials based on errors arising outside of the
record and errors of law or fact arising from the merits of the case
support the jury's verdict. The court would not enter a judgment of acquittal, but it granted
the defendants a new trial. Id. at 11.
State's Brief, supra note 3, at 1.
State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 363, 322 A.2d 809, 811 (1974). The state's petition was
made pursuant to N.J.R. 2:12-2, which authorizes a motion for certification of unheard
appeals pending in the appellate division.
6 65 N.J. 359, 322 A.2d 809 (1974).
IId. at 374, 322 A.2d at 816. In arriving at this conclusion, the court first rejected
defendants' argument that the new trial had been granted on the basis of unarticulated
factors solely within the discretion of the trial court. Id. The court held that there was "little
doubt" that the new trial had been granted because of an excessively narrow reading of State
v. Gattling, 95 NJ. Super. 103, 230 A.2d 157 (App. Div. 1967), and a misreading of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:121-3a (1969) with respect to the element of knowledge in the offense of
working for a lottery. 65 NJ. at 374, 322 A.2d at 816. N.J.R. EvID. 55 provides that
"evidence that a person committed a crime ... on a specified occasion . . .is admissible to
prove some .. .fact in issue including .. . knowledge" with respect to a crime committed on
another occasion. By virtue of Gattling and the aforementioned rule, the court concluded
that the surveillance evidence was admissible with respect to the "working for" charge. 65
N.J. at 374, 322 A.2d at 816-17. It could find no reason to believe that the evidence had not
been properly considered by the jury in arriving at its guilty verdict on the "working for"
count. Id. at 374-75, 322 A.2d at 817. In addition, the court saw no inconsistency in finding
the defendants guilty of working for a lottery and innocent of possession of lottery slips. Id.
at 375, 322 A.2d at 817. The court stated that
evidence of furtive conduct or scanty records, which might not be sufficient to
demonstrate possession, could legitimately support the inference that a defendant
did use slips while working for a lottery.
Id.
8 42 NJ. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964).
9 Id. at 103, 199 A.2d at 633-34.
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itself as no longer logical, and thus held that the scope of the state's
right to seek leave to appeal should be expanded to include all
orders granting new trials in criminal cases.'" This decision represents less of an attempt to broadly enlarge the state's right of
appeal in criminal cases than an attempt by the New Jersey supreme court to bring state case law into conformity with the rules
governing appellate practice adopted in 1969.11
The right of the state to appeal in criminal cases is an issue in
which society's interest in efficient and effective criminal procedure
conflicts with the right of the accused to be free from oppressive
governmental prosecution. The fact that opposing interests are
involved, as well as an absence of a clear historical mandate, t 2 has
promoted confusion and a lack of uniformity among the jurisdictions as to whether the state may appeal in criminal cases, and,
where such a right exists, what the scope of that right is.
The "overwhelming weight of American authority" holds that
the state may appeal a judgment of acquittal, whether that judgment rests upon a jury verdict or a question of law, only if such an
appeal is expressly authorized by statute. 1 3 The state jurisdictions
10 65

N.J. at 363, 322 A.2d at 810-11.

In 1969, the rules governing practice and procedure in the state's courts underwent
an entire revision and reorganization. Among the newly adopted rules was N.J.R. 2:3-1b(5)
which permitted the state to ask leave to appeal any interlocutory order granted after trial.
The scope of the right to appeal granted by this rule was broader than that granted by
LaFera. Thus, there existed a conflict between the state's decisional law and court rules. For
further discussion of this conflict see notes 79-80 infra and accompanying text.
"SMiller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 490-91 (1927); Comment, State Appeals in Criminal Cases, 32 TENN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1965). There is some
division of opinion as to whether there existed in early English common law a right of the
sovereign to appeal in criminal cases. Professor Miller, in his oft-cited article, states that
"[p]rior to 1700 there was no right to an appeal or writ of error, even upon the part of a
defendant, except as a matter of grace." Miller, supra at 490. However, it has been observed
that certain remarks by Lord Coke strongly implied the right of the King to re-indict an
accused in cases of an erroneous judgment of acquittal. Note, Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky.
L.J. 628, 628-29 (1957).
"S United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892). The right of the United States to
appeal in federal criminal cases is statutory and limited. It was not until 1889 that a
defendant in a federal court was afforded an appeal as of right in a criminal case. Carroll v.
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400-01 (1957). The Act of February 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25
Stat. 656, authorized review by the Supreme Court on a writ of error of all convictions in the
federal courts involving capital offenses. Two years later the right to review was extended to
infamous crimes as well. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827. By 1897, appellate
jurisdiction for noncapital infamous crimes was withdrawn from the Supreme Court and
conferred on the courts of appeals. Act of January 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492.
The Supreme Court would not concede any right of appeal to the Government in
criminal cases until Congress passed the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907. Carroll v. United
States, supra at 401-02. Pursuant to that act, the Government could take a writ of error in a
criminal case from (1) a judgment which either quashed an indictment or arrested a
"
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take a wide range of positions on the right of the state to appeal.
One extreme absolutely prohibits all state appeals in criminal
cases,' 4 while the other extreme allows the state to seek leave to
appeal on all questions of law arising at trial in the same manner
and to the same extent as the defendant.'

5

This wide diversity

evidences the freedom of the states to experiment in formulating
criminal appellate procedure. Underlying much of this legislative
experimentation has been a recognition of the need to safeguard
the individual liberties of defendants,' with the notable consequence that the right to appeal has generally been extended far
more generously to the criminal defendant than to the prosecution.
The primary argument for barring state appeals in criminal
cases subsequent to an acquittal of the defendant has been based
on the constitutional protection from double jeopardy.' 7 Other
rationales include the protection from undue hardship of the defendant whose resources are invariably meager compared to those
of the state,' 8 and the desire not to diminish the significance of jury
verdicts. 9 It has also been suggested that our present one-sided
system of appellate review in criminal cases has persisted because
defense attorneys, who often exert much influence on legislative
conviction for insufficiency of an indictment, where such judgment was "based upon the
invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment [was] founded," or (2) a
judgment which sustained a special plea in bar where the defendant had not yet been put
into jeopardy. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. Appeals by the United States in
criminal cases are now limited to those taken from orders dismissing an indictment or
information as long as the defendant is not threatened with double jeopardy, and from
suppression orders affecting important evidence as long as "the defendant has [not] been
put in jeopardy" and before there has been a "verdict or finding on an indictment or
information." 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
'4 For example, the Texas state constitution provides: "The State shall have no right of
appeal in criminal cases." TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 26.
15 Connecticut is perhaps the most liberal jurisdiction in permitting the state to appeal
in criminal cases:
Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court, upon all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the
permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court, in the same manner and
to the same effect as if made by the accused.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (Supp. 1974-75).
16 Miller, supra note 12, at 491; Note, supra note 12, at 629.
'7 Miller, supra note 12, at 491. For general discussions of double jeopardy as it applies
to state appeals in criminal cases see id. at 491-96; Comment, The State Right to Appeal: Has
Maine Been Too Cautious?, 21 ME. L. REV. 221, 221-25 (1969); Comment, supra note 12, at
458-62; Note, supra note 12, at 631-36; Note, The Right of State Appeal in Criminal Cases, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 545 (1955).
"SOrfield, Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases, 15 ORE. L. REv. 306, 310-11 (1936);
Comment, supra note 12, at 462-65.
I" Miller, supra note 12, at 497-99; Comment, supra note 12, at 465-66.
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matters and who also enjoy many advantages appurtenant to freedom from appellate review by the state, have sought to maintain
the status quo. 2 " Notwithstanding these considerations, most state
jurisdictions do permit some form of appeal to be taken by the
state in criminal cases, at least With respect to lower court rulings,
when such appeals do not place the defendant in double jeopardy.

21

In New Jersey, the state has steadfastly' been denied the right
to appeal a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. The first decision to deal squarely with this question was State v. Hart,22 a case in
which the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant and
accordingly, the jury found the defendant not guilty. 23 The state
then sought to prosecute a writ of error on a point of law. 24 The
first appellate court dismissed the writ, finding neither statutory
authority allowing a writ of error after an acquittal at trial, nor case
law supporting the position that such authority derived from English common law.25 The court stated that "it has been taken for
granted by bench and bar that the state was not entitled to . . .
review . . . of an error in law by the trial judge. '26 The highest
court in the state affirmed, declaring that it was the "unquestioned
practice in this state" that no writ of error should lie to review a
judgment of acquittal. 2 7 The court also observed that the New
Jersey Constitution of 1844 provided explicitly that no person
could be tried a second time for the same offense after an acquittal. 28 Thus, there could be no statutory authority enacted which
could confer any right of review to the state where there had been
an acquittal. 29 The clause barring a second prosecution for the
same offense after an acquittal was included in the 1947 constitution currently in effect, 30 and underlies the New Jersey courts'
20 Comment, supra note 12, at 466.

See id. at 452-56.
88 N.J.L. 48, 95 A. 756 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 90 N.J.L. 261, 101 A. 278 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1917).
23 88 N.J.L. at 48, 95 A. at 757.
21

22

24

Id.

Id. at 49-50, 95 A. at 757.
26 Id. at 51, 95 A. at 757-58.
27 90 N.J.L. at 269, 101 A. at 281. The court noted that the practice of permitting the
Attorney General in England to take a writ of error in a criminal case was meant to effect
the prerogative of the King to favor or prejudice the case of a defendant. The court felt that
such a practice was inconsistent with free government. Id.
21 Id. See N.J. CONsT. art. 1,
10 (1844).
29 90 N.J.L. at 269, 101 A. at 281.
CONST. art. 1,
11, states in pertinent part: "No person shall, after
30 N.J.
25

acquittal, be tried for the same offense."
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continuing refusal to permit the state to appeal acquittals in crimi31
nal cases.
The highest court in New Jersey recognized as early as 1900
that when the defendant was not acquitted at trial, the state should
be able to take an appeal. In State v. Meyer,3 2 the state sought to
appeal the reversal of a criminal conviction. 33 The defendant
moved to dismiss the state's writ of error on the ground that the
state was not entitled to such a writ in a criminal case.3 4 In denying
the defendant's motion, the court looked to English common law
and a state statute as authority for the right of the state to take a
writ of error in a criminal case.3 5 The court emphasized, however,
that where the defendant has been acquitted at trial, a retrial was
barred by the state constitution.3 6 Thus, the case clearly indicates
that whether the defendant was acquitted at trial is dispositive of
the state's right to appeal in criminal cases. While an acquittal
serves as an absolute bar to subsequent appeals by the state, a
decision favorable to the defendant which does not constitute an
3 7
acquittal is not similarly precluded from appellate review.
" See, e.g., State v. Smith, 21 N.J. 326, 332-33, 121 A.2d 729, 732 (1956); City of
Newark v. Pulverman, 12 N.J. 105, 112, 95 A.2d 889, 892 (1953); State v. Sheppard, 125
N.J. Super. 332, 336, 310 A.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 1973); State v. Fiore, 69 N.J. Super. 122,
124-27, 173 A.2d 561, 562-64 (App. Div. 1961).
32 65 N.J.L. 233, 47 A. 485 (Ct. Err. & App. 1900).
33 Id. The defendant in Meyer had been convicted of causing the death of a woman
following an attempt to abort her pregnancy. State v. Meyer, 64 N.J.L. 382, 383, 45 A. 779,
779 (Sup. Ct. 1900). The conviction was reversed on the ground that dying declarations of
the deceased should not have been admitted at the defendant's trial. Id. at 386, 4,5 A. at 780.
31 65 N.J.L. at 233, 47 A. at 485.
31 Id. at 236-37, 47 A. at 486.
36 Id. at 236, 47 A. at 486. See also note 28 supra and accompanying text.
11 Exactly what constitutes an "acquittal" so as to bar further state action in a criminal
case, however, is not a simple question. For example, there seems to be little doubt that a
directed verdict in the defendant's favor will serve as an acquittal so as to bar an appeal by
the state. State v. Hart, 90 N.J.L. 261, 261, 270, 101 A. 278, 278, 281 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917).
See also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (even though the granting of a
directed verdict was "egregiously erroneous," double jeopardy barred a retrial). The standard to be applied by a trial judge when granting a directed verdict in New Jersey is the
same as that to be applied when granting judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict. State v.
Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341, 327 A.2d 232, 235 (App. Div. 1974). Yet, when a
defendant is granted a judgment n.o.v., this is not an acquittal which precludes a subsequent
state appeal. In State v. Kluber, the appellate division of the superior court stated:
[A] judgment of acquittal n.o.v. . . . involves no issues of fact .... The sole issue...
is a question of law. We do not conceive that our Constitution contemplated that
such a judgment of acquittal should be accorded the same nonappealable status as
either a verdict of acquittal entered by a jury or a directed verdict entered by a
judge during or at the conclusion of the trial.
Id. at 344, 327 A.2d at 236. Thus, Kluber gives some advice as to what the constitution did not
intend to serve as a bar to state appeals. Nevertheless, precisely what does constitute an
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The question of the state's right to appeal the granting of a
new trial in a criminal case has not received extensive discussion in
New Jersey case law. In State v. Hunter,38 a 1949 case decided by
the appellate division of the superior court, Judge William J.
Brennan, Jr. discussed appellate review of trial court action on a
motion for a new trial. He noted that the grant or denial of a new
trial was discretionary and therefore seldom interfered with on
appeal. 3 9 He observed, however, that "that discretion is a judicial

40
discretion controlled by established rules and may be abused.
This language clearly suggests the propriety of appellate review of
an alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court in either granting
or denying a new trial. However, inasmuch as the decision concerned the denial of a motion for a new trial, Judge Brennan's
remarks constituted dictum with respect to the granting of a new

trial.

41

The first step toward permitting the state to appeal the granting of a new trial in criminal cases may have occurred in 1953 in
State v. Tune, 42 which seemed to erode the general rule that inter"acquittal" under article 1, paragraph II of the state constitution remains uncertain. See
note 30 supra.
1s 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A.2d 274 (App. Div. 1949).
19 Id. at 536, 68 A.2d at 276.
40

Id.

At the time Hunter was decided in 1949, it seems improbable that the granting of a
new trial order could have been appealed by the state in either the appellate division or the
supreme court. In 1949, criminal procedure in New Jersey was governed by court rules
newly adopted pursuant to the 1947 state constitution which provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts
in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts.
N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,
3.
Criminal appeals in the appellate division of the superior court were governed by
N.J.R. 4:2-3 (1948), which stated that "[aIppeals may be taken to this court in criminal
causes, on leave granted, to obtain review, hearing, and relief in lieu of prerogative writs.
(emphasis added).
Any time a new trial is granted in a criminal case, the controversy is renewed thereby,
and any judgment rendered at the first trial cannot be final. State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97,
104-05, 199 A.2d 630, 634 (1964). Inasmuch as the writs of error and certiorari employed to
obtain appellate review before 1947 could not issue prior to a final judgment, it is unlikely
that the appellate division would have granted the state leave to appeal the granting of a new
trial in a criminal case in 1949. See State v. Verdon, 94 N.J.L. 375, 377, 110 A. 818, 819
(Sup. Ct. 1920).
State appeals to the supreme court in criminal cases were permitted by N.J.R. 1:2-3
(1948), which stated:
The Attorney General or any County Prosecutor, as the case may be, on behalf
of the State shall have the same right to an appeal to [the supreme court] from any
final judgment rendered in the Appellate Division as is accorded to a defendant.
(Emphasis added). Thus, it appears that in 1949, the granting of a new trial could not have
been appealed in the supreme court.
42 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). In Tune, the state successfully appealed
an inter41
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locutory orders could not be appealed except under extraordinary
circumstances. 4 3 In Tune, the court recognized that if the state were
not permitted to appeal an interlocutory order at the time the
order was issued, regardless of the final outcome on the merits, it
would be afforded no opportunity to make its argument. 4 4 This
problem is clearly demonstrated when the state is not permitted to
appeal the grant of a new trial. If the defendant is granted a new
trial, at which he is again convicted, he will not raise the issue of
the granting of his new trial if he subsequently appeals. Conversely, if the defendant is acquitted at the new trial, the state would be
foreclosed from raising an appeal by the state constitutional bar
against retrying an acquitted defendant.
This problem was recognized in 1955 by the Supreme Court's
Committee on Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, and this, in
part, prompted its recommendation that the court provide a clear
provision in the rules allowing the state to appeal from an adverse
interlocutory order.4 5 In the same report the Committee also advised that the state be allowed to appeal the granting of a new
trial.4 6 One year later the Committee's recommendations were still
under consideration when the supreme court decided State v.
Haines.4 7
In Haines, the defendant, who was convicted of false swearing
before a grand jury, subsequently "moved... for a new trial on the
locutory order "granting the defendant the right to inspect his confession." Id. at 209, 98
A.2d at 883-84. The supreme court waived the rule barring such appeals prior to a final
judgment in order to "best serve the ends of justice." Id. at 209, 98 A.2d at 884 (citing
Hendrikson v. Koppers Co., 11 N.J. 600, 605, 95 A.2d 710, 713 (1953), a civil case).
13 See Board of Health v. New York Cent. R.R., 10 N.J. 294, 301, 90 A.2d 729, 732
(1952) (appeal of interlocutory order allowed in order to decide questions "essential to the
determination of' appeals taken from another decision); cf. State v. Peterman, 29 N.J.
Super. 236, 237, 102 A.2d 398, 399 (App. Div. 1953) (appeal from an order denying motion
to dismiss indictment allowable only "in a flagrant case or one where the indictment upon its
face appears to be clearly defective in substance").
11 13 N.J. at 209, 98 A.2d at 884. The defendant, having received the benefit of an
interlocutory order, would not appeal the grant of that benefit even if he were subsequently
convicted. On the other hand, if he were acquitted, the state would be precluded from
appealing that order by the state constitution which bars the retrial of an acquitted defendant. See note 30 supra.
"I REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON APPEALS BY THE STATE
IN

CASES 8-9 (1955).
46 Id. at 9. The Committee reasoned that new trials are generally granted on the

CRIMINAL

grounds that either the verdict was not supported by the evidence, or that reversible legal
error had occurred. In the former case the prosecution generally dismisses the indictment
voluntarily rather than prosecute a second trial. The Committee believed that the defendant
would be in no way prejudiced if the state had the additional option of appealing the grant
of the new trial. Id.
47 20 N.J. 438, 120 A.2d 118 (1956).
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ground that newly discovered evidence . . . bore materially on the
credibility of" the state's sole witness.48 When the motion was denied, defendant appealed, and the supreme court granted certification while the case was pending in the appellate division. Chief
Justice Vanderbilt, delivering the court's opinion, discussed the
power of the trial judge to set aside a jury verdict on the basis of
witness credibility. He warned that "this power . . . must be used
with utmost discretion," especially in a criminal case where "unlike
in a civil case the State has no right of appeal from an order
granting a new trial."49 The Chief Justice's comment -clearly constituted dictum since it was the defendant who was appealing the
denial of a new trial. Nonetheless, that dictum represents the first
words of the highest court in New Jersey to squarely address the
right of the state to appeal the granting of a new trial in a criminal
case.
Notwithstanding the Chief Justice's remarks in Haines, four
years later in State v. Rosania,5 0 the state successfully appealed an
order entered by the Essex County Court which set aside the
defendant's conviction and granted him a new trial." Although the
defendant had sought relief by a motion for a new trial, the judge
treated the motion as an application for a state writ of habeas
corpus in order to avoid a potential problem of timeliness. 5 2 When
an order granting a new trial was entered, the state appealed. The
supreme court reversed the lower court action,5 3 but at no time
addressed the issue of the right of the state to appeal such an
order. As such, it is unclear whether this case represented a step by
the supreme court to liberalize the state's right to appeal in criminal cases. 54 In any case, by spring of 1961, the supreme court
had not yet made any move to implement the recommendation
that the state be permitted to appeal interlocutory orders and
grants of new trials, as had been advanced by the 1955-Committee
55
on Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases.
In May 1961, a new report submitted by the Supreme Court's
4s

Id. at 442, 120 A.2d at 120.

Id. at 447, 120 A.2d at 123.
50 33 N.J. 267, 163 A.2d 139 (1960).
49

51 Id. at 268, 277, 163 .A.2d at 140, 144.
52 Id.
at 273, 163 A.2d at 142. Rosania and two co-defendants had been convicted eight
years earlier of first-degree murder. Rosania did not appeal his conviction and did not seek
post-conviction relief until his co-defendants had been awarded new trials on constitutional
grounds following a federal habeas corpus action. Id. at 268-70, 163 A.2d at 140-41. See
United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873
(1957).
53 33 N.J. at 277, 163 A.2d at 144.

1975]

NOTES

Committee on Criminal Procedure renewed the recommendation
that the state be allowed to appeal from an interlocutory order, not
as of right, but on leave of the appellate division.5 6 The report did
not, however, concur with the opinion of the 1955 Committee with
respect to appeals of new trial orders.5 7 Rather, it reasoned:
In the majority of instances such orders are based upon an
evaluation of the evidence which is peculiarly for the trial court's
determination. In the light of the long history of non-review in
such cases and the absence of any pressing condition or circumstance warranting a change, we feel that the present practice
[of barring the state from appealing
a trial court order granting
58
a new trial] should be continued.

Soon after this report was submitted, the supreme court amended
the court rules to allow the state to appeal in criminal cases from an
interlocutory order entered prior to trial upon leave of the proper
appellate court.5 9 Although this rule change served to expand the
state's right to appeal in criminal cases, it clearly could not have.
been intended to permit an appeal of an order granting a new trial
since such an order could not be entered prior to trial. 60 Nevertheless, five months after the rule change was adopted, the state, in
5' It is possible that the issue was not raised because the proceeding had taken on the
characteristics of a habeas corpus proceeding to such an extent that it was no longer
regarded as a step in the original criminal action. It has generally been acknowledged that
the state may appeal an adverse judgment from a habeas corpus proceeding. See note 74
infra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
5

REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

22-23 (1961).
Ild. at 25.
IId.
N.J.R.R. 1:2-4(c) was adopted July 27, 1961. It stated in part:
(c) In any criminal cause the plaintiff may appeal to the appropriate appellate
court:
(I) from an interlocutory order entered before trial, upon leave granted by the
appellate court ....
Id. (emphasis added).
" The right of the state to appeal an interlocutory order was limited to pretrial orders,
apparently to avoid double jeopardy problems. State v. Taylor, 81 N.J. Super. 296, 305, 195
A.2d 485, 490 (App. Div. 1963).
Pretrial interlocutory orders in criminal cases appealable by the state under N.J.R.R.
1:2-4(c) (1961) have included: (1) orders permitting the defendant to withdraw a plea of non
vult and stand trial, State v. Daniels, 38 N.J. 242, 246-48, 183 A.2d 648, 650-51 (1962); (2)
orders declaring a confession inadmissible at trial, State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 590, 231
A.2d 598, 599 (1967); (3) orders suppressing state's evidence as the fruit of an unreasonable
search, State v. Taylor, supra at 299, 195 A.2d at 486-87. Courts have exhibited some
flexibility in construing the "pretrial" requirement in the interest of justice. See, e.g., id. at
299, 195 A.2d at 487, where the state was permitted to appeal a suppression order entered
after the jury had been impanelled.
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State v. Levitt, 61 appealed an order of the Burlington County Court

granting a new trial in a criminal case. The issue of whether the
state had the authority to appeal that order, however, was never
confronted.
State v. LaFeran2 was the first decision of the New Jersey supreme court to explicitly discuss the right of the state to appeal an
order granting a new trial in a criminal case. In LaFera, the defendants appealed after being convicted of conspiracy to rig bids on a
public project. 6 3 Before argument, a remand was obtained in order
to apply to the trial court for a new trial on the ground that a
biased juror had prejudiced the defendants.6 4 The trial court subsequently ordered a new trial, and the state was granted leave to
appeal that order. The appeals of both the state and the defendants were certified by the supreme court before argument in the
appellate division. The supreme court, per Chief Justice Weintraub, found it unnecessary to decide the state's appeal because it
reversed the defendant's convictions.6 5 However, the court felt the
need to "express some views" on the appealability of new trial
orders.6 6 Recalling that it had recently amended the New Jersey
court rules in order to establish "a single all-embracing procedure
for post-conviction review, 6 7 the court realized that "the question
as to the scope of the State's right of appeal" had been overlooked . 8 The court apparently sought to repair the oversight in
part by generating a rule concerning the right of the state to
appeal a new trial order.
6 36 N.J. 266, 176 A.2d 465 (1961). The defendant in Levitt was convicted following a
jury verdict of guilty. The day after the jury returned its verdict, one of the jurors
telephoned the trial judge and related to him certain allegedly prejudicial statements made
by various jurors during their deliberation. The judge relayed this information to both the
prosecutor and defense counsel, and when the latter moved for a new trial on the ground of
jury misconduct, the judge granted the motion. Id. at 268-69, 176 A.2d at 466. The state
appealed, arguing that the comments of the jurors were not prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
at 270, 176 A.2d at 467. The order granting the new trial was subsequently affirmed. Id. at
275, 176 A.2d at 470.
62 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964).
63 Id. at 99, 199 A.2d at 632.
64 Id. at 100, 199 A.2d at 632.
65
66

Id.
Id.

Id. at 102, 199 A.2d at 633. N.J.R.R. 3:IOA-I to -13 were adopted on December 9,
1963, four months before LaFera was decided. These rules provided for the use of a
petition, directed to the same court in which a defendant was convicted, for the purpose of
obtaining post-conviction relief where appellate review was not available. These provisions
mentioned the state only with respect to the right to file an answer to such a petition, or to
move for its dismissal. See N.J.R.R. 3:10A-9 (1963).
66 42 N.J. at 102, 199 A.2d at 633.
67
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The court recognized the conflict between the Haines dictum"'
and the appeals taken by the state in Rosania70 and Levitt, 7 1 and

noted what it termed the "general proposition" that new trial
orders were not appealable by the state. 72 It then analogized a
motion for a new trial to a habeas corpus proceeding, stating that
the distinction between the two had become somewhat obscured. 3
Observing that the state had the right to appeal from a judgment
in a habeas corpus proceeding,"4 the court saw no rationale for
allowing the state's right to appeal to turn on whether the defen75
dant's vehicle for relief was "given one tag rather than another.
The court was convinced that the right to appeal should depend
upon the nature of the issue, i.e., if the new trial were based on
"fundamental unfairness" at trial or lack of jurisdiction of the
court, the new trial order should be appealable, while if the new
trial were granted on an issue going to the merits of the case itself,
an appeal should not be permitted. 76 Thus the court stated:
. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
70 See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.

See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
199 A.2d at 632.
73 Id. at 101, 199 A.2d at 633. The writ of habeas corpus had traditionally been limited
to challenging the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is questioned. See Knewel v.
Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 659 (1895); Andrews
v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 276 (1895). This restricted use of the writ has been expanded in
recent times to the extent that the writ now serves as a vehicle for challenging almost any
sort of unlawful governmental restraint. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963);
Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CANADIAN B. REV. 92, 93
(1938). The expansion of habeas corpus inevitably resulted in an overlapping between the
remedies available to a defendant by means of a new trial motion and a habeas corpus
proceeding, as demonstrated in State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103, 106 A.2d 294 (1954). In Grillo,
the defendant employed a new trial motion in order to assert a denial of due process on the
ground that a juror was biased. Id. at 106, 106 A.2d at 295. The motion was denied, but that
denial was based on the merits, not because a new trial motion was an improper vehicle for
asserting such a claim. Id. at 115, 106 A.2d at 300. Later, Grillo asserted the same claim in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding where he eventually prevailed on appeal. United States ex
rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d I (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
14 42 N.J. at 101, 199 A.2d at 633 (citing State v. Daniels, 38 N.J. 242, 246, 183 A.2d
648, 650 (1962)). See also Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 442-43 (1925).
71 42 N.J. at 102, 199 A.2d at 633.
76 Id. at 103, 199 A.2d at 633-34. The distinction LaFera drew was based on what the
court perceived to be the difference between issues remediable by the traditional new trial
motion and the expanded habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 103, 199 A.2d at 634. The
essence of the court's reasoning appeared to be that the state should have the right to appeal
an order granting a new trial where that order rests on an issue from which the defendant
might have sought his remedy by a habeas corpus proceeding. The court recognized that
had the defendant prevailed at a habeas corpus proceeding, the state would have the right to
appeal the judgment. Id. at 101, 199 A.2d at 633. In order that the state's right to appeal not
be predicated upon the vehicle of relief chosen by the defendant, where the defendant
could have later sought habeas corpus relief but rather moved for a new trial, and that
71

72 42 N.J. at 100-01,
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It seems to us that the correct rule is this: the State may not
appeal from a trial court's order for a new trial based upon the
record of the trial itself (including newly discovered evidence
which must be weighed in the light of the existing record). On
the other hand, if the attack is collateral in nature and involves
issues not litigated in the main
case, the order should be review77
able on the State's behalf.

It was determined, in addition, that new trial orders, granted for
whatever reason, should be deemed interlocutory, and therefore
appeals of such orders should stand not as of right, but by leave of

the appellate court. 78 The LaFera court, then, attempted to resolve
the confusion and apparent contradictions in the law with respect
to the state's right to appeal an order granting a new trial by
establishing a guiding rule.
Nevertheless, within five years the issue was again beclouded
when in 1969 the New Jersey court rules were completely revised.
At that time N.J.R.R. 1:2-4(a), (c)(1)-(2), 3:2A-10, and 3:5-5(b)(7),
which governed the right of the state to appeal in criminal cases,
were all assimilated into the new N.J.R. 2:3-1 which states in part:
In any criminal action the State may appeal or, where appropriate, seek leave to appeal ...
b. to the appropriate appellate court from:

79
locutory order entered before or after trial.

..

.

(5) an inter-

A post-conviction order granting a new trial is clearly within the
scope of the rule. As such, the new rule conflicted with LaFera in
motion was granted, the state should have the right to appeal that order. Thus, under
LaFera, whether a particular new trial order was appealable reduced to whether the order
was based on an issue reachable by habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus, even with its modern expanded scope, "cannot be used as a substitute
for an appeal to attack trial errors." In re Garofone, 80 N.J. Super. 259, 281, 193 A.2d 398,
411 (L. Div. 1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 244, 200 A.2d 101 (1964). Issues subject to appeal, then,
should not be reachable by a habeas corpus proceeding.
The scope of appeal in New Jersey is determined by the rules of court. At the time
LaFera was decided, the rule governing the scope of appeal was N.J.R.R. 1:5-1 (1958). That
rule extended the right of appeal "[i]n criminal causes [to] errors apparent on the face of the
judgment record." Id. (emphasis added). Since errors on the face of the judgment record were
appealable and hence not subject to habeas corpus review, the state could at no time appeal
an adverse judgment on such an issue. Thus, there was no reason to allow the state to appeal
new trial orders based on such an issue apparent on the face of the trial record.
Collateral issues, however, were not appealable, although they were reviewable on
certification to the supreme court. See N.J.R.R. 1:10-IA (1967), -3 (1963). Thus, these issues
were reachable by habeas corpus. As such, LaFera reasoned that new trials based on such
issues should be appealable because habeas corpus relief granted to a defendant would be
appealable.
11 42 N.J. at 103, 199 A.2d at 633-34.
7s Id. at 103-04, 199 A.2d at 634.
" N.J.R. 2:3-1 (emphasis added).
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that it expanded the scope of the state's right of appeal to include
new trial orders grounded on the trial record itself. The rules
revision coordinating committee was fully cognizant of this conflict
when they submitted the proposed rules revision in November
1966, and advised that the question be submitted to the supreme
court for further consideration 8 1 Nonetheless, the rule, as finally
adopted in 1969, did not provide for the rule established by the
LaFera dictum. Thus, N.J.R. 2:3-lb(5) arguably supplanted LaFera.
Until State v. Sims, however, there was no attempt by the courts to
resolve the apparent contradiction.
The Sims court, noting that "[t]his case calls upon the Court to
clarify the law in New Jersey" regarding the state's right to appeal
an order granting a new trial to a criminal defendant,8 ' proceeded
to abolish the LaFera ban on appeals of new trial orders not based
on collateral matters arising outside the trial record s2 The court
thereby enlarged the scope of the state's right to appeal to include
all new trial orders, and eliminated the apparent conflict between
the state's decisional law and court rules.
The Sims court based its decision in part on its opinion that the
distinction LaFera made between the two classes of new trial orders8 3 had grown unworkable.8 4 The court observed that habeas

corpus had continued to expand since LaFera to the extent that its
reach now seemed infinite, and particularly significant, that
[t]he record of the trial, once considered immune from collateral
that a habeas
attack . . . may now be scrutinized to 8insure
5
petitioner has had a full and fair hearing.
80 The committee noted in the tentative draft comment to rule 2:3-1:
A further problem concerning the State's right to appeal from an interlocutory
order entered after trial is raised by State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 100-105, 199 A.2d
630 (1964) and its intended scope. Reading that case literally, several members of
the Committee recommend that R. 2:3-1 (b) (5) provide that the State may appeal
'an interlocutory order entered before or after trial, except an order granting a
new trial based upon the record of the trial itself." Other members doubt that the
Court in LaFera intended to preclude a State's interlocutory appeal from an order
granting a new trial if the trial judge, e.g., is persuaded that he erred in allowing or
excluding certain evidence or in giving or denying a certain charge to the jury.
Such grounds for a new trial would be, of course, "based on the record of the trial
itself." The tentative conclusion of the Committee was to omit the exception based
on LaFera from the rule, but to submit the question to the Court's further consideration.
PROPOSED REVISION OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

RULE 2:3-1, Comment 7 (1966).
8' 65 N.J. at 362, 322 A.2d at 810.
82 Id. at 363, 322 A.2d at 810-11.
s' See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
84 65 N.J. at 369, 322 A.2d at 814.
85 Id. at 368, 322 A.2d at 813 (emphasis by court) (citation omitted). In recent years
trial court records have been inspected at habeas corpus proceedings (1) in order to
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As such, consistent with the LaFera analogy between new trial
motions and habeas corpus proceedings, the state should have the
right to appeal new trials grounded on noncollateral issues. 86 The
court then analyzed the traditional justifications for limiting the
state's right to appeal in criminal cases and stated that to permit the
state to appeal a new trial order was not to place a defendant in
double jeopardy. 8 7 Nor would such appeals be unconscionably
burdensome to an indigent defendant, because of the availability of
free legal assistance 8 8 and a free transcript on first appeal. 9 Furthermore, because such appeals rested on the discretion of the
appellate court, the defendant would be effectively protected
against bad-faith prosecution by the state. 9" Finally, the court
found that N.J.R. 2:3-lb(5), a court rule adopted by the state
supreme court pursuant to the state's constitution,9 1 constituted
determine whether there was any evidence presented at trial on which a conviction might
rest, United States ex rel. Victor v. Yeager, 330 F. Supp. 802, 806 (D.N.J. 1971); United
States ex rel. Mallory v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 373, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 912 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965), and (2) in order to review the admissibility of evidence
at trial, United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199, 206 (D.N.J. 1971). The
United States Supreme Court has held that it is the duty of a federal district court in a
habeas corpus proceeding to scrutinize a state court record whenever fundamental rights are
claimed to have been infringed. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963).
s6 65 N.J. at 363, 368, 322 A.2d at 810-11, 813-14. The Sims court was critical of
LaFera's characterization of habeas corpus as a civil proceeding, a characterization which
justified the state's right to appeal in such an action. Id. at 369, 322 A.2d at 814. The court
observed that many of the rights accorded a criminal defendant had been extended to a
habeas petitioner. It cited an opinion of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that
a habeas proceeding is essentially unique, and that to characterize it as civil is " 'gross and
inexact.' " Id. (quoting from Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969)).
s7 65 N.J. at 370-71, 322 A.2d at 814-15. This conclusion is supportable by two lines of
reasoning. First, it is arguable that there can be no second jeopardy until the first jeopardy is
culminated by a final judgment. Id. at 370, 322 A.2d at 814. But see United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1971) (reprosecution barred by double jeopardy where mistrial was
declared to benefit Government's witnesses). For example, it has been established that there
is no double jeopardy if the state seeks to retry one whose conviction has been set aside
because of reversible trial error. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 463-64 (1964). See also
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134-35 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Second, it
may be reasoned that when a defendant asks for a new trial following conviction, he thereby
waives any right to claim double jeopardy if the state seeks to prosecute that new trial. Trono
v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905). Thus, if the state seeks to appeal the order
granting a new trial, and thereby terminate the prosecution without subjecting defendant to
a new trial, it is difficult to see how the defendant may contend double jeopardy.
88 65 N.J. at 371, 322 A.2d at 815. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58
(1963).
11 65 N.J. at 371, 322 A.2d at 815. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
90 65 N.J. at 371, 322 A.2d at 815.
91 Rules of criminal procedure are established in New Jersey by the state supreme court
pursuant to N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,
3. See note 41 supra:
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adequate legislative authority for such appeals "in lieu of statutory
sanction.'"2
The Sims court, in addition, indicated that the argument in
favor of permitting the state to appeal new trial orders was supported by a number of practical policy considerations: (1) since
errors benefitting the defendant would "be less likely to be perpetuated," the criminal law of the jurisdiction stood to develop "in
a fairer way"; (2) trial courts would be apt to proceed with greater
caution and diligence because their rulings would be subject to
review proceedings instituted by either side; (3) there would be less
inclination to lean prejudicially in favor of the defendant at trial;
(4) defendants would be less likely to unjustly escape conviction as
a result of trial error; and (5) there would seem to be no rationale
for preventing the state from raising the same arguments on its
own appeal when a new trial is granted which it could raise as
respondent on an appeal taken by the defendant if the new trial
were denied. 3 The Sims decision, then, was based on a combination of factors, including the beliefs that the LaFera rule was outdated and unworkable, that permitting the state to ask leave to
appeal the granting of a new trial would not subject the criminal
defendant to an unconscionable prosecution, and that practical
benefits to the criminal law of the state would be promoted
9 4

thereby.

While Sims serves to expose all new trial orders in criminal
cases to appellate review, it is reasonable to suggest that only a
92
93

65 N.J. at 371-72, 322 A.2d at 815-16.
Id. at 372-73, 322 A.2d at 816. For a discussion of the fifth consideration see ABA

PROJECT ON MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

RELATING TO CRIMINAL

39 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
14 At least one argument opposing state appeals of new trial orders was not addressed
by the Sims court. The ABA Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review has expressed
doubt as to whether it is "necessary or sound" to allow post-trial appeals by the state when it
is clear that had a trial court "ruled in favor of the defense contentions during trial rather
than after trial," only a few states would allow the prosecution to appeal. ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 93, at 39. In New Jersey, the state may not appeal an interlocutory order issued
during the trial. N.J.R. 2:3-Ib(5). The ABA argument suggests that by permitting the state
to appeal a post-conviction new trial order, the defendant forfeits his immunity from
appellate review of a trial ruling in his favor, simply on the basis of his timing in making his
contention. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 93, at 39. While it is true that the appealability of a
court order should not rest on the defendant's timing, the weakness in the ABA argument is
that the reason for barring appeals of interlocutory orders granted during the trial is not to
grant the defendant the irreversible benefit of court errors in his favor, but rather to avoid
the suspension of trials already begun until an appeal is decided, such a delay causing
prejudice to the parties and placing an unreasonable burden on the jury. PROPOSED REVIAPPEALS

SION

OF THE

RULES

Comment 6 (1966).

GOVERNING

THE

COURTS OF THE STATE

OF NEW JERSEY,

RULE

2:3-1,
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small fraction of those orders will be successfully appealed by the
state. Trial courts do not grant new trials capriciously; when they
grant new trials they are expressing the opinion that the defendant
has not had a fair trial and is entitled to another day in court in the
interest of justice. 5 A trial judge may fairly conclude that the
defendant has been unfairly prejudiced in a myriad of ways imperceptible from the trial record. 96 While there is no problem of
unfairness to the defendant if an appellate court should reverse a
new trial order granted solely on a question of law, 9 7 substantial
injustice could result if an appellate court were to reinstate a
conviction by reversing a new trial order granted on the basis of
some factual determination solely within the discretion of the trial
court. The Sims court, however, rejected the practice of limiting the
state's right to appeal new trial orders on a "law-fact" dichotomy as
has been adopted in other jurisdictions, stating that such a practice
seemed likely to create confusion. 98 The court saw no reason for an
appellate court, when considering whether to grant the state an
appeal, to give special deference to such factual matters as the trial
cou rt's
determination as to worth of certain evidence, plausibility or
consistency of individual testimony, and other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record ....

99

On the other hand, intangible considerations such as the trial
court's views on witness credibility and demeanor are to "be
weighed heavily."' 0 0 However, problems must inevitably arise because an appellate court "cannot follow the mental processes of the
[trial] judge."1'0 Unless the trial judge expressly stipulates his
reason for granting the new trial, there stands the risk of an unjust
95 See N.J.R. 3:20-1 concerning the standards for granting a new trial in a criminal
case.
96 State v. Clark, 171
Kan. 734, 737, 237 P.2d 255, 257 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 630, 168 A.2d 328, 329 (1961).
91 Cf. State v. Taylor, 60 Wash. 2d 32, 40, 371 P.2d 617, 621 (1962).
98 65 N.J. at 367-68 n.2, 322 A.2d at 813. For examples of jurisdictions which employ
the law-fact dichotomy see Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 629, 168 A.2d 328,
329 (1961); State v. DesChamps, 126 S.C. 416, 418, 120 S.E. 491, 492 (1923); CONN. GEN.
74 7
STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (Supp. 19 - 5)- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-179 (1965).
" 65 N.J. at 373, 322 A.2d at 816. See Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7, 258 A.2d 706,
708-09 (1969).
100 65 N.J. at 373, 322 A.2d at 816. See Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7, 258 A.2d 706,
708 (1969).
101 People v. Canfield, 173 Cal. 309, 312, 159 P. 1046, 1048 (1916).
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preemption of the trial judge's discretion. 1 2 One solution might be
to require the state to ask leave to take its appeal from the trial
judge who granted the new trial rather than from the appellate
court.' 0 3 In that way the judge would be free to grant the state
leave to appeal a new trial order if it were granted on a point of
law or on an issue of fact discernible from the trial record and thus
his judicial discretion would not be infringed. In the rare case in
which a trial court erroneously grants a new trial on a point of law
and then refuses to grant the state leave to appeal the new trial
order, the state would be injured only to the extent of having to
reprosecute the case. Such may be the cost of assuring the defendant's right not to be convicted unjustly.
Jeffrey M. Schwartz
102 There are subtle pressures on a trial judge which may make him reluctant to express

his true reasons for granting a new trial. A trial judge may doubt the credibility of important
witnesses to such an extent that he sincerely feels a new trial would be in the interest of
justice. Yet he may have strong reservations against publicly characterizing the testimony of
the witnesses as suspect. There may also be cases where a judge simply has strong but
inarticulable feelings that justice has not been accomplished. Again, the judge may be
reluctant to state such a nebulous, albeit legitimate, reason for granting a new trial. Brief of
Defendants-Respondents at 6-7, State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 322 A.2d 809 (1974).
103One commentator has recommended that the state should be able to appeal an
acquittal in a criminal case if (1) the appeal were limited to a question of law and (2) the state
were granted leave to appeal by the trial judge. Note, supra note 12, at 637.

